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Abstract 
This paper applies the theory of bureaucracy to a collective 
bargaining arrangement in the public education labor market. A cyclical 
voting model is used to explain homogeneous wage demands by education 
associations. The bilateral monopoly problem is explored under the 
assumption that educators bargain as "Niskanen-type" bureaus when local 
school boards lack the ability to quantity adjust between bargaining 
periods. Increased appropriations to educators are shown to accrue only 
to existing organization members with no new teachers hired to share in 
the gains. The results imply that arguments for lower student-teacher 
ratios are spurious, while the appropriation gains from collective 
bargaining could represent social waste. 
INTRODUCTION 
The functional distribution of income treats the value of factors 
of production as derived from the value of the output which they 
1 produce. A notable exception is the public education labor market. 
Absent a definition of output which can be successfully measured, the 
profession relies on experience and formal training as proxies for 
value. The wage scale in the nation's public schools is based only on 
seniority and education. Given this institutional setting, the technique 
of this paper is to treat bargains for entry wage and wage increases as 
determined by the median voter in a political allocation process, 
wherein teachers request across-the-board increases divorced from 
productivity~ 
The education association can be viewed as performing several 
functions in the process. First, it acts as an information bearing 
vehicle which sells the average productivity of its members to the local 
school board. Second, it attempts to increase the quality of the 
educator's output by promoting a lower student-teacher ratio. · Finally, 
it attempts to coerce the political machine into granting increases 
without regard to measurable performance. I will argue that this last 
function is conducted more fervently than the others and that the 
determination of the wage paid to public educators is an important topic 
to be added to the theory of bureaucracy. The paper will use the public 
choice methodology to explain the flow of funds to education. The major 
conclusion is an antithesis to arguments that the allocation of 
resources to this sector is an index of quality or productivity. 
First, I discuss the impact of a collective bargaining agreement 
that meets with the approval of a majority of the organization members 
1 
and replaces a productivity based wage scale. Next, agenda control is 
introduced into the bargaining process and a nontraditional outcome is 
derived in a bilateral monopoly setting. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the implications for public education. 
WAGE DEMANDS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Collective bargaining in the public sector, although a relatively 
recent phenomena, has been the subject of considerable discussion in the 
. 1 · 2 economic iterature. The public education market because of its 
visibility, the proportion of local government expenditures required to 
support it, and the remarkable ability of the education associations to 
successfully organize the labor force, has received a large amount of 
h . 3 t e attention. Most of these studies have been empirical and the 
1 . 1 . 4 resu ts inconc usive. The effect of collective bargaining on industry 
wages is still at issue, and the effect on fringe benefits has not been 
examined. No theory exists to explain the incidence of across-the-board 
wage demands or their pervasiveness in the education industry; nor is 
there a model which derives the effects of this form of bargaining on 
prices and outputs in the education labor market. 
The failure to address these issues has been characterized as the 
"union as a black box" weakness or the assumption that "a union is a 
union is a union. 115 Unions, however, are democracies wherein all 
workers receive equal representation and democratic choices imply unique 
results. A public employee union is not a private employee union and 
this seemingly trivial, but potentially important, difference may 
require an altered format for research. Education is a public good and 
bargains for the supply of public goods require a different calculus 
than that employed in the private sector. 
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The national, state, and local education associations bear a close 
resemblance in structure to their private sector counterparts in the 
manufacturing and construction industries. The wage demands in the 
education industry differ, however, in one important respect from those 
in the private sector. The labor force, which is heterogeneous, 
presents to the employer a wage demand which is across-the-board or 
homogeneous at the entry level, and demands equal percentage wage 
increases for all members. Although there are no apprentice, 
journeyman, or master educators, the secondary mathematics teacher has 
measurably different training and skills from the primary kindergarten 
6 teacher. The anomaly is that all teachers request and receive · the same 
entry level wage and ensuing percentage wage increases. Why does a 
labor force with differential skills and opportunity costs fail to 
demand a differential wage scale? 
Consider, as the initial example, a school system composed of three 
teachers producing a homogeneous product. Each is an elementary school 
teacher; however, their productivity is measurably different. The 
annual wage increase paid to these individuals is productivity based and 
an increased expenditure on education equal to twelve hundred dollars is 
to be divided among the three. Let the distribution equal (2/3, 1/3, 0) 
where the first teacher is the most productive and receives an eight 
hundred dollar raise, the second teacher is the median producer and 
receives a four hundred dollar raise, and the third teacher who is the 
least productive receives no raise at all. 7 The process is repeated 
annually with each educator striving to maintain or increase his/her 
relative productivity. rhis outcome is the determinate one as long as 
relative productivities remain constant. 
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Now introduce a collective bargaining process in which wage demands 
must receive the approval of a majority of the teachers in the system. 
The problem is an exercise in game theory and one possible outcome is 
the distribution (2/3, 1/3, 0) which was observed in the productivity 
based example. This outcome will now be unstable when relative produc-
tivities remain constant. 
The least productive teacher can bribe the median producer with an 
offer of (0, 2/3, 1/3). The most productive teacher receives no 
increase, the median producer receives an eight hundred dollar increase 
and the low producer, a four hundred dollar increase. The low and 
median producers are better off, the most productive teacher is worse 
off and the distribution is approved 2 to 1. This outcome will also be 
unstable. 
The first teacher can now bribe the third teacher with an offer of 
( 1/3, 0, 2/3) • The first and third teachers are better off at the 
expense of the second and the distribution is approved 2 to 1. The 
least productive teacher receives the largest raise, the median producer 
receives no raise, and the most productive teacher receives the median 
raise. This outcome is also unstable and in the .next year the 
distribution is returned to the original (2/3, 1/3, 0). This three year 
cycle can be envisioned as continuing through time. 
A three teacher system is difficult to imagine. However, the 
process can be generalized to a larger system. Consider a nine teacher 
system in which ther e are heterogeneous inputs. Three of the 
individuals are secondary mathematics teachers, three are secondary 
science teachers, and three are elementary teachers. The opportunity 
cost to enter or continue in the education profession is the income 
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foregone in the private sector. Due to differential opportunity costs, 
a productivity based wage scale divides the increases in the manner 
(2/9, 2/9, 2/9, 1/9, 1/9, 1/9, 0, o, 0). 8 
Now introduce a collective bargaining process. The bargaining 
incentives are the same. The recipients of a zero raise will offer to 
those who receive the median wage an opportunity to replace those who 
receive the highest wage. A new distribution (0, O, 0, 2/9, 2/9, 2/9, 
1/9, 1/9, 1/9) will emerge. We can generalize ton individuals, 
disciplines, or departments in the system and three groups will be 
observed: those who receive the largest increase, those who receive the 
median increase, and those who receive the smallest increase. Although 
no teacher wishes to receive the smallest increase, the process which 
drives the analysis is the vulnerabilityof those who receive the 
largest increase. Their continued replacement and the resulting 
division of all increases among a coalition of the other workers will 
generate the cyclical process described in the three-teacher system and 
this cycle can be envisioned as a continuing one in an n teacher 
9 
system. 
We do not observe a three year cycle of wage demands in the public 
education system. The bargaining process has a stable outcome; teachers 
demand across-the-board percentage increases divorced from productivity. 
Although there is no restriction on coalition formation - secondary 
mathematics and science teachers could bargain as an independent unit -
intraunion conflict does not appear to be a major problem. Where that 
conflict surfaces, the issue is rarely whether the members should 
bargain collectively; there is almost universal agreement that teachers 
must remain united on the issue of equal percentage wage increases. 
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Perhaps agreement is the inappropriate term as there are sanctions for 
_those who aspire to more than mediocrity. 
There are two reasons to expect that all parties will agree to 
receive the same percentage increase as an alternative to participation 
in the cyclical process. The first is perfect foresight. All of the 
individuals involved understand the sanctions, envision the game 
unfolding and opt for the expected value of the increase. The second 
reason is at best an innocuous and at most a pernicious one. All but 
one coalition may disappear. There is no pecuniary incentive for work 
effort as divorcing each educator's remuneration from individual 
performance leaves the employer no opportunity to identify the marginal 
employee. Those teachers who are the most productive leave the system 
and their exit raises the previously median producers to the most 
productive status. The median, now most productive educators exit and 
only those with an opportunity cost below the wage paid to the least 
productive teacher remain in the system. All teachers are average and 
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the average teacher is a poor producer. 
The distribution of the total wage bill into equal percentage 
increases poses no problem for a union composed of average teachers; _ it 
does pose an incentive problem for a heterogeneous union membership. 
Cyclical wage bargains imply that educators are treated as homogeneous 
inputs. If all members of the association are not average, how can the 
collective bargaining arrangement be viewed so favorably by the above 
t h h d t h t . f h f . ll average eac er w o oes no c oose o exit rom t e pro ession? 
AGENDA CONTROL 
The problem for the school board initially appears as identical to 
that faced by the employer in the private sector. A wage demand is made 
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by the union on behalf of its members and although the private sector 
demand may include various wage · scales for differential skills, the 
alternatives available appear to be the same. The employer must accept 
the wage increase demanded or offer an alternative increase and 
entertain the prospect of a strike. There is one important difference, 
however, between the private sector bargain and the public sector 
bargain. The employer in the private sector is not asked to accept a 
total wage bill, instead the demand is for an increase in the per unit 
wage rate. A decision variable is then left to the discretion of the 
employer; he can quantity adjust. 
Since the corporation president has every aspect of his firm's 
performance evaluated daily by the market, new hires, layoffs, 
reductions in the number of shifts worked, the opening and closing 
of plants are all viable opportunities which can affect the total wage 
bill between bargaining periods. There is no requirement to make a total 
evaluation of ·the labor input's value and this is an advantage which the 
school board does not enjoy. The school board is asked to approve a 
total wage bill or total education appropriation at each bargaining 
session, and in order to do so, calculate the total value of the 
educator's input. Limiting the bargaining agenda to this dimension 
requires the employer to choose a total package of education or revert 
to the purchase of no education at all. 
The introduction of this form of agenda control in the education 
market has as its analogue all-or-nothing budget demands by other 
< 
bureaus in the public sector. Since educators "do not appropriate any 
part of the difference between revenues and costs as personal income and 
the recurring revenue of the organization derives from other than the 
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sale of output at a per-unit rate," the education association qualifies 
. k b 12 as a Nis anen ureau-. The lotal association offers a .set of 
activities called instruction and an associated output described as 
education for a total budget. The association's package offer give it 
"the same type of bargaining power as a profit seeking monopoly that 
discriminates among customers or that presents the market with an 
11- h' h . 13 a -or-not 1ng c oice. The reason for the educator's differential 
bargaining power is the failure by the public to present a significant 
alternative and a general unwillingness to forego the purchase of public 
d . 14 e ucation. 
Consider a local school board as the sole employer of public school 
teachers and the local association as the sole bargaining agent for 
employees. The bilateral monopoly problem is represented in Figure I. 
Wage cycling results in a heterogeneous union membership which treats 
the labor input to education as homogeneous. The school board faces a 
horizontal marginal cost curve for labor and the traditional result is 
somewhere between points Band D. 15 
The school board's preferred employment-wage combination is 
determined by the intersection of the marginal cost and demand curves 
for labor. Employers offer to hire at L for a wage equal to W at 
0 0 
point B. The teacher's preferred combination is at point D and is 
determined by the intersection of the marginal demand and marginal cost 
curves for labor. The union offers to supply L1 teachers for a wage 
equal to w1 . The model is indeterminate and who chooses the point 
between Band D depends on the relation between the returns to, and cost 
of making a bargaining commitment. 
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The association is expected to attack the outcome at Bon two 
familiar grounds. First, they would argue that wages are too low, and, 
second, that student-teacher ratios are too high. An increase in the 
effectiveness of the union's bargaining prowess should result in a 
significant increase in wages under .the traditional analysis. However, 
unless all current employees can be protected from layoffs or 
termination, the student-teacher ratio will rise. Educators, not 
unaware of this dilemma, bargain in an untraditional manner; they make 
all-or-nothing offers of a total output for a budget to be divided on an 
equal percentage increase basis~ The all-or-nothing or the average 
evaluation demand curve is drawn as a reference point for these 
bargains in Figure I and labeled AON. The area under a coordinate on 
this curve is equal to the integral under the marginal evaluation or 
demand curve at the corresponding employment level. The all-or-nothing 
demand curve allows us to visualize the employer's total evaluation of 
16 
the education package. 
The union makes an all-or-nothing offer to supply L teachers for a 
0 
total education appropriation of OEBL. The school board desires to 
0 
hire the L teachers and places a total value of OEBL on their 
0 · 0 
services. Rather than forego the alternative of receiving no services 
at all, the board agrees to the proposal. The total wage bill is 
,conflict with regard to the wage and no teachers are terminated. The 
total appropriation is increased by WEB due to the all-or-nothing 
0 
bargaining arrangement. Since W0 EB is equal to w0 w1cB the additional 
appropriation is just sufficient to increase the L teachers' wage from 
0 
9 
w0 to w1 . Differential bargaining power has an asymmetrical impact; 
wages are increased and the student-teacher ratio is unaffected. 
Although agenda control in the bargaining process may placate the 
above average educator who is deprived of a productivity based wage 
increase, the education association's appeal for increased 
appropriations could rest on more altruistic grounds. One widely 
accepted index of quality education is a low student-teacher ratio and 
presumably the additional monies could have been spent to hire 
addition .al teachers. 
Consider a union which characterizes a lower student-teacher ratio 
as a bargaining success. The all-or-nothing wage proposal for quality 
education could contain an offer to supply L2 teachers at a wage equal 
to W. There is no conflict with regard to the wage paid, however, the 
0 
increase in employment is unattractive to the school board and to the 
existing union membership. Acquiescence to the union's proposal of more 
teachers for more money would result in inefficiency in the education 
system. The inefficiency is equal to the area BFG. Although the total 
appropriation is equal to the total value placed on education, for any 
teacher hired in excess of L, the marginal value to the employer is 
0 
less than the marginal cost of an additional hire. The union membership 
objects for a separate reason. The increased appropriation necessary to 
expand employment from L0 to L2 is equal to the area L0 BFL2 • Since BFG 
= W0 EB = W0 W1CB, agreement at point F rather than at point C transfers 
'bl . f . . t . · mb l7 possi e gains rom existing o new organization me ers. 
Although I have made no survey of union proposals, union demands 
for increased wages are well publicized while offers to supply more 
teachers are not. Abundant but imperfect information suggests bargains 
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are for point C. A bargaining success is characterized by the education 
association as an increase in the total wage bill to be divided among 
the existing members with no additional members hired to share in the 
gains. Demands for lower student-teacher ratios may be vacuous and 
perhaps serve to distract attention from the total wage bill. 
The important point is that resources will be dissipated by the 
current members of the organization to capture the area WEB rather than 
0 
the area BFG. The large number of educators present as delegates and 
alternates at the Democratic National Convention suggests that a 
sizeable amount of resources are expended in this manner. The above 
average producer can turn his energies to more than one task and 
ba .rgains for point C allow the association to · harness the energy of the 
most productive teacher for the lobbying effort. The area WEB could 
0 
18 
represent a waste rather than a transfer of resources. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have followed a methodological approach which is 
consistent with the Theory of Public Choice. I offered an understanding 
of one institution that has emerged in the area of public education. 
Cyclical voting among union members results in a bargaining arrangement 
wherein the education association treats all teachers as average 
producers and makes an all-or-nothing wage demand for increased 
education appropriations. This institution differs fundamentally from 
conventional wage demands in the private sector. The inability of the 
school board to quantity adjust between bargaining periods limits the 
agenda to be considered in a manner which mitigates the employer's 
bargaining position. Agenda control has important results for the 
taxpayer-voter who consumer public education. 
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First, a sharing arrangement devoid of any response to productivity 
may erode the quality of education produced. Good teachers are 
increasingly difficult to hire and this difficulty is accentuated by a 
collective bargaining agreement. second, the total wage bill and the 
tax bill required to finance it are substantially increased in an a11-
or-nothing wage demand environment. Finally, support for a lower 
student-teacher ratio, although desirable from a quality education 
viewpoint, may not be a goal of the professional organization repre-
senting public school teachers. The major inference of these results is 
that collective bargaining in the public sector is a more powerful tool 
in the hands of an education association than that possessed by its 
counterpart in the private sector. 
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